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Abstract
Since they have been increasingly used in economics, elicitation rules for sub-
jective beliefs are under scrutiny. In this paper, we propose an experimental design
to compare the performance of such rules. Contrary to previous works in which
elicited beliefs are compared to an objective benchmark, we consider a pure sub-
jective belief framework (confidence in own performance in a cognitive task and a
perceptual task). The performances of elicitation rules are assessed according to
the accuracy of stated beliefs in predicting success. For the perceptual task we also
compare stated beliefs to Signal Detection Theory predictions. We find consistent
evidence in favor of the Lottery Rule which provides more accurate beliefs and is
not sensitive to risk aversion. Furthermore the Free Rule, a simple rule with no
incentives, elicits relevant beliefs and even outperforms the Quadratic Scoring Rule.
Beside this comparison, we propose a belief formation model where we distinguish
between two stages in the beliefs: beliefs for decision making and confidence beliefs.
Our results give support to this model.
Keywords: Belief Elicitation, Confidence, Signal Detection Theory, Methodology,
Incentives, Experimental Economics
JEL Classification: D81 D84 C60 C91
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Re´sume´
Depuis que leur utilisation s’est re´pandue en e´conomie, les re`gles d’e´licitation font
l’objet d’une attention particulie`re. Dans ce papier, nous proposons une proce´dure
expe´rimentale pour comparer les performances de telles re`gles. Contrairement aux
travaux pre´ce´dents dans lesquels les croyances e´licite´es sont compare´es a` des proba-
bilite´s objectives, nous conside´rons ici un cadre de croyances purement subjectives
(la confiance en sa propre performance dans une tache cognitive et une tache per-
ceptive). Les performances des re`gles sont juge´es en fonction de la capacite´ des
croyances e´licite´es a` pre´dire la re´ussite. Pour la tache perceptive, nous comparons
aussi les croyances e´licite´es aux pre´dictions issues de la de´tection de signal. Nos
re´sultats sont en faveur de la Lottery Rule qui e´licite des croyances plus justes et
qui n’est pas de´pendante de l’aversion au risque. De plus, la Free Rule, une simple
e´licitation sans incitation, e´licite des croyances pertinentes et offre mme de meilleurs
re´sultats que la Quadratic Scoring Rule. Au-dela` de cette comparaison, nous pro-
posons un mode`le de formation des croyances au sein duquel on distingue deux
niveaux de croyances : celle utilise´es pour la de´cision et celles lie´es a` la confiance.
Nos re´sultats supportent ce mode`le.
Mots cle´s : Elicitation de croyances, confiance, The´orie de la de´tection de signal,
Me´thodlogie, Incitations, Economie expe´rimentale
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1 Introduction
Suppose that agents have somewhere in their mind subjective beliefs about some uncertain
event. The history of beliefs’ elicitation is rich as researchers have long been interested in
this issue. In particular, following Cooke (1906) pathbreaking contribution, meteorologists
have formally investigated this question for more than a century1. Quite surprisingly,
it is only recently that economists have seriously investigated this issue. The current
number of works focusing on empirical elicitation of beliefs has been rapidly increasing.
For instance, Nyarko and Schotter (2002) study beliefs in experimental games, whereas
Dominitz and Manski (1997) and Manski (2004) used surveys in order to elicit individual
beliefs concerning significant personal events. There also exist a parallel literature in
psychology. In many experiments subjects are asked to report their belief that they
adequately performed a task. These particular type of beliefs are thus often refereed to
as confidence judgment or as metacognitive ability.
A common feature of these approaches is that they try to elicit ”true” beliefs. This
common goal however hides some differences across approaches. Meteorologist are mostly
interested in comparing beliefs across individuals. They had thus been looking for elic-
itation rules that shape beliefs so as to express them on a common scale. Following
the revealed preference approach, economists are interested in creating choice situations
in which beliefs can be inferred through costly actions. They are thus very attached to
elicitation rules that provide monetary incentives, so that subjects will loose money if
they do not report their true belief. As the most popular elicitation rule in meteorology,
namely the Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR), does provide the kind of incentives economists
are looking for, it has been imported in economics and has remained the most popular
elicitation rule in experimental economics (see Gneiting and Raftery (2007) for a survey
on proper scoring rules). Note that, so far neither economists nor meteorologists paid
much attention to the type of reasoning that individuals may use to form their beliefs. In
contrast, psychological experiments in which beliefs are elicited try to understand how the
brain works when forming beliefs, or more precisely, when subjects are asked to provide
judgment on their own performance. The main concern is to understand the cognitive
process associated with the formation of beliefs (Dawes (1980), Baranski and Petrusic
(1994))). Furthermore, the common practice is to use simple ordinal scales (e.g. Likert
scales), without incentives. In what follows, we call this type of rule, ”free” rules.
Thus, despite a common interest in beliefs elicitation, existing approaches still rest on
1See Murphy (1998) for an history of the early developments of beliefs elicitation
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different elicitation rules. Does one of these approaches perform better than the others?
To tackle this question, we propose to compare the relative performance of elicitation
rules in an experimental setting in which subjects perform two tasks. The first one is a
quiz task quite common in economics and psychology to assess subjects overconfidence
(Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977), Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982), Wallsten
and Budescu (1983) or Camerer and Lovallo (1999), among others), the other task is a
classical perception task often used to measure confidence.The most widely used elici-
tation rules are the Quadratic Scoring Rule -in economics and meteorology- and simple
ordinal rules -in psychology-. However, there are growing methodological concerns about
elicitation rules2. In particular, the QSR was found to have some important limitations.
Thus we will consider a third elicitation rule into the analysis, called the Lottery Rule.
We also propose a set of criteria allowing for elicitation rules to be compared. We find
consistent evidence that the Lottery Rule outperforms both the QSR and the Free Rule
whatever the nature of the task to be performed.
At a more fundamental level, this papers also offers insights on the nature of belief
formation. Economists have often been concerned about the realism of their hypotheses
and this also applies in the case of subjective probabilities. Axiomatic decision theory just
argues that agents behave as if they maximize a subjective expected utility. Whether these
subjective beliefs do really exist -in the sense that they can be directly measured using
some physical device- remains an open question. However, Signal Detection Theory, a
widely used approach in neurophysiology, offers a simple model of how the brain processes
information. Applying this model to our data allows predicting confidence levels. We find
that a particular elicitation rule, the Lottery Rule, elicits precisely the kind of signals that
are assumed to be used in forming beliefs. So everything goes on as if the brain processes
some signals that encode the beliefs and that a particular elicitation rule is able to elicit
these signals. If such results are to be confirmed by further works, economists may well
be able to open the black box of belief formation.
This article is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce our experimental devices
with the psychometric and epistemic tasks and we set forth our beliefs formation models;
in Section 3 we describe the main properties and the experimental design of the Quadratic
Scoring Rule, the Lottery Rule and the Free Rule; in Section 4 we present the criteria
to compare elicitation rules; in Section 5, we use the data to perform this comparison;
2See Andersen, Fountain, Harrison, and Rutstrom (2010), Offerman, Sonnemans, Van de Kuilen, and
Wakker (2009), Palfrey and Wang (2009), Armentier and Treich (2010), Hao and Houser (2010), Hossain
and Okui (2010) or Kothiyal, Spinu, and Wakker (2010)
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in Section 6 we carry some further analysis and we suggest some interpretation of our
results; Section 7 concludes.
2 Experimental devices for subjective beliefs
If agents have somewhere in their mind subjective beliefs that we try to elicit, then
obviously, the closer the elicited beliefs are to the ”true” one, the better is the rule. The
main problem is that the ”true” belief is in general not observable. Before presenting
our approach, we first explain why we do not consider the case in which an objective
probability is given. Until now most evaluation methods proposed have followed this
latter methodology. For instance, one elicits a subject’s beliefs concerning the possible
outcome of a dice roll. The quality of the rule is then measured by the difference between
the objective probability and the elicited beliefs. It is, for instance, the approach that
Armentier and Treich (2010) have followed to assess the QSR using various level of stakes,
either real or hypothetical. In a similar vein, Holt and Smith (2009) evaluate an explicit
and incentive scoring rule (the so-called Lottery Rule) in an experiment on Bayesian
updating. Note that these contributions do not compare different elicitation rules. So far
as we know, the only contributions doing so are Hossain and Okui (2010), who observe
that the rule they developed performs as well as the QSR, and Hao and Houser (2010) who
compare two variants of the Lottery Rule. Both contributions take objective probabilities
as a benchmark.
However, eliciting beliefs about objective probabilities might be misleading. First of
all, even in a situation of objective uncertainty, the result will depend on how well subjects
understand probability theory. If we assume that individuals deviate from the theory of
probabilities, then their beliefs could differ from the objective probabilities. In such a
case, a rule that allows for a perfect elicitation of individuals beliefs will be considered to
perform poorly. Moreover, an objective probability setting may force subjects to think in
terms of probabilities whereas they proceed differently in a subjective setting. In other
words, the quality of an elicitation rule in a subjective setting cannot be deduced from
its performance in an objective setting.
We thus face the following question: how the quality of elicited beliefs can be assessed
without knowing the subjective beliefs we try to elicit? One contribution in this paper
consists in answering this question. The key consists in submitting subjects to two suc-
cessive exercises, i.e. take a decision and then assess their confidence in the decision made
6
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through an elicitation rule. These sequences are repeated several times and trough two
experimental settings: a psychometric one and an epistemic one.
2.1 Psychometric model
Let us first consider the perceptual task, often used in psychophysics (Dawes (1980),
Baranski and Petrusic (1994)). The aim of this task is to compare the number of dots
contained in two circles (see Figure 2). The two circles are only displayed for a short frac-
tion of time, about one second, so that it is not really possible to count the dots. Subjects
have to tell which circle contains a higher number of dots and then, their confidence in
the choice made is elicited through an elicitation rule.
Figure 1: Perceptual task
We consider five levels of difficulty, i.e. bigger or smaller differences in the number
of dots in each circle. The difficulty of the task depends on the subject’s performance
and is calibrated so that at each level the success rate is the same for each subject, using
a psychophysics staircase (Levitt (1971)). Compared to the quiz questions, this setting
offers to control for the difficulty of the task according to individual skills. Furthermore,
as perceptual tasks are fast, it allows for a high number of trials.
A crucial feature of the perception setting is that it provides enough information to
predict confidence level. To do so, we use Signal Detection Theory. The starting point
of Signal Detection Theory is that most reasoning and decision making take place in the
presence of some uncertainty (Green and Swets (1966)). According to Signal Detection
Theory, subjects are assumed to receive a noisy signal provided by the sensory system
7
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which treats the stimuli, e.g. in our task subjects only get some noisy information about
the number of dots in each circle. In its most basic version, the model assumes that if
x is the number of dots, the vision system sends a quantitative signal y which follows
a normal law. Therefore, when observing two circles with respectively xL and xR dots
(where L and R stand for left and right), the brain receives two signals yL and yR. Given
the real difference x˜ = xL−xR, the brain receives a y˜ = yL−yR difference in signal which
follows a normal law N (xL − xR, σ
2
i ) where σi reflects the sensibility quality of agent i’s
vision system. Signal Detection Theory assumes that the brain system operates as if he
was able to run Bayesian analysis of perceptive signals. Thus, to make his guess, the
subject computes the posterior probabilities about the real difference x˜ given the signal
y˜ received: he guesses left in case Pr(x˜ ≥ 0|y˜) ≥ .5.
We use this approach to predict the expected distribution of confidence3. The idea is
the following (see the appendix for more detail): given the signal received y˜, the agent
forms beliefs about the real difference in dots using Bayes law and choose accordingly.
To apply Bayes law, we assume that the agent is aware of the probability distribution of
dots used during the task and of his own sensibility quality σi
4. We suppose then, that
confidence in one’s guess is closely related to the belief formed to make that decision.
Thus, from the distribution of signal y˜ given a certain x˜ we can estimate a distribution
of confidence p for each possible level of difficulty. Using the probability distribution of
dots, expected distributions of confidence can be predicted as well as the values of the
different criteria presented hereafter.
Figure 2 offers a representation of the way we assume the brain to process informa-
tion. One area is responsible for receiving the signal that is transmitted to a distinct
3See Galvin, Podd, Drga, and Whitmore (2003) and Fleming and Dolan (2010) for a similar approach.
4In the task, there was always a circle which contains 50 dots and the second circle contains 50± αj .
The choice of the 50 dots circle and of αj was randomized at each trial. In such a case, posteriors are
such that a subject guesses left if y˜ is positive. Five levels of difficulty were defined. Two were the same
for all subjects: l) level α0 = 0: the two circles contain 50 dots and success was randomly drawn, 2)
level α4 = 25: the second circle contains 75 dots and the difference of dots becomes so important that
this level leads to a sure choice. Three levels were intermediary and adapted to each subject. During
the training part, the medium difficulty level α2 was adjusted to a value in order to make the subject
succeed in 70% of the case at this level. That means that α2 is such that F (0|α2, σ
2
i ) = .3 where F is
the cumulative distribution for the normal law. The table of values indicates that σi =
α2
.52
. The two
other levels were fixed respectively at α1 =
α2
2
. and α3 = 2α2. Then predicted success rate at level α1
is 1 − F (0|α2
2
,
(
α2
.52
)2
) ≈ 0.60 and 1 − F (0|2α2,
(
α2
.52
)2
) ≈ 0.85 at level α3. In fact, the training part was
not perfect and during the main task the mean success rate for all subjects was in reality at 67.7% at
level α2. Then the model predicts that we should observe a 59% success rates at level α1 and 82 % at
level α3. Compared to the observed success rates which stand at 59% and 80% respectively, this model
appears to be quite robust.
8
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Figure 2: The psychometric model (perceptual task)
area in charge of forming beliefs. This signal is in turn used to assess confidence. Al-
though very simple this representation of the brain is supported by recent evidence in
neuroeconomics. For instance, Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, and Rees (2010) and Rounis,
Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, and Lau (2010) provide evidence that the brain areas
responsible for performing the task and assessing confidence are distinct. We also know
that signal transmission from one area to another could be problematic. Del Cul, Bail-
let, and Dehaene (2007) indeed show that subjects may use subliminal signal to perform
adequately a task, i.e. they perform above chance, but are also unable to report accurate
beliefs, i.e. their beliefs are not distinct from pure guessing. We interpret this finding
as evidence that the brain adds some noise to the initial signals. Hence, our confidence
distributions’ predictions based on the SDT model are correct only if the noise is small.
An extremely noisy case would be a person whose confidence is completely disconnected
from beliefs.
Given this belief formation model, let us now explain why the choice of an elicitation
rule may matter. It may be the case that elicitation rules do not elicit the same beliefs.
They may elicit the beliefs formed at the decision stage or the confidence or something
else... An other problem may be that rules are more or less efficient in revealing confidence
signals. Indeed, it may depends on the physical type of these signals.
But then, how can we assess the relative performances of rules? First, even if the noise
occurring in the brain process between beliefs and confidence makes our SDT predictions
uncertain, if we find a good fit between elicited confidence and expected confidence this
brings support to the related rule. Second, the SDT model shows that subjects are accu-
9
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rate probability assessors of their success. Indeed, Bayes law implies that their beliefs are
equal to the real probability of success. Thus, we should observe in the data that subjects
are accurate probability assessors. Therefore, the subjects abilities to discriminate will
be our main criteria to compare the rules.
2.2 Epistemic model
In our epistemic design, subjects have to answer a quiz of general knowledge and logic
with ”yes” or ”no” answers. After each question, they have to give their level of confidence
about the accuracy of their response. This level of confidence is elicited by three different
eliciting rules presented in the next section. The main mechanism of the model could be
summarized by the Figure 3.
Figure 3: The epistemic model (quiz task)
We assume that, facing the quiz, the subject that takes his own level of knowledge as
a basis, has a subjective probability about the answer to the question (”Yes” or ”No”).
This subjective belief determines his decision. Then we elicit the confidence the subject
has in his answer. This two-steps protocol, often used in psychology, is representative of
real situations. We often have to make a choice between two alternatives. Our subjective
confidence in that choice determines the extent to which we commit to a path and we
hedge our bets. Asking how much one believe the right answer is ”Yes” allows for a direct
elicitation of subjective beliefs but this way of proceeding is not very natural.
Even if the epistemic and the psychometric tasks imply different brain areas, we assume
that the belief formation follows the same process. Thus, Figure 3 presents an adaptation
of the previous model to the epistemic task. Contrary to the perceptive task where we
10
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can rely on Signal Detection Theory, we do not know how beliefs correlate with success.
Yet we suppose that subjects are still good probability assessors. Indeed, we expect that
the more robust is one opinion, the more confident he is in his answer and the more likely
he is to be right. Thus the quality of judgment of the subjects is still a relevant criterion
for comparing rules.
Note that if the brain uses the same circuit to form beliefs in both perceptual and
epistemic tasks, then we should observe some relation between tasks. Those who are good
probability assessors in one task, should also be good in doing so in the other task. Such
results would support this belief formation model.
3 Elicitation rules
In this section, we will describe the three types of rule used, discuss their main theoretical
properties and present their experimental design.
3.1 Quadratic Scoring Rule
In experimental economics, the most commonly used rule is the Quadratic Scoring Rule 5.
In its most simple version, when only two outcomes ”success” or ”failure” are considered,
the Quadratic Scoring Rule rest on a score (or reward) of Ssuccess = 1−P
2
failure if ”success”
is the true state of nature and Sfailure = 1−P
2
success if ”failure” is the true state of nature
6. Remark that this standard theoretical presentation refers heavily to some subjective
probabilities a subject has in mind. As noted in the introduction, this explicit reference
is not necessary listed in the instructions provided to the subject.
Note also that this rule guarantees a sure payment when subjects report the same
probability for each possible outcome. Thus risk averse subjects may prefer a sure payment
5Nyarko and Schotter (2002), Offerman, Sonnemans, Van de Kuilen, and Wakker (2009), or Palfrey
and Wang (2009))
6Note that under this rule, a subject who reports a value of .5 for both probabilities will get a sure
score of 0.5. Suppose now that he reports a probability of success of .7, he thus gets a gamble with .7
chance to get 0.91 and .3 chance to get 0.51. This results in an expected gain of 0.79. This extends to
more general cases where there are n possible outcomes
Si(p) = α− β
n∑
k=1
(Ii,k − pk)
2
were Ii,k takes value 1 if i = k and 0 elsewhere.
11
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rather than a risky one. On a theoretical ground, it is well known that elicited beliefs
through QSR for risk averse subjects are below their subjective beliefs7.
In our experiment we use the Quadratic Scoring Rule given in Table 1.
Choice
Correct 10 9.98 9.90 9.78 9.60 9.38 9.10 8.78 8.40 7.98
Incorrect 0 0.98 1.90 2.78 3.60 4.38 5.10 5.78 6.40 6.98
7.5 6.98 6.40 5.78 5.10 4.38 3.60 2.78 1.90 0.98 0
7.5 7.98 8.40 8.78 9.10 9.38 9.60 9.78 9.90 9.98 10
Table 1: Quadratic Scoring Rule
Subjects can thus get a sure payment of 7.5e or take greater risks, e.g. receive 10e if
their choice is correct, but 0e if they fail. Note that the corresponding probability were
not reported. Indeed, subjects were not told that if their confidence were at a certain
probability level, then they should choose a particular column. We feel that this unusual
presentation is more in line with a revealed preference approach and reduces confusion
with the Free Rule.
3.2 Lottery Rule
In this experimental study, in order to elicit the level of confidence, we also use a pro-
cedure (henceforth, the Lottery Rule) whose principle is known for long (Arrow (1951),
Raiffa (1968), Winkler (1972), LaValle (1978) among others...) but rarely put in practice
(Grether (1992), Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber (2005), Holt (2006), Holt and Smith
(2009) are some exceptions). Subjects are asked to report the beliefs about a given event,
say their probability of success in a given task. Now consider a first lottery, called the
task-lottery. According to the task lottery, the subject gets a positive reward, S, if he
succeeds and a smaller reward F < S, if he fails. If his subjective probability of success is
p, the subject should be willing to exchange his task lottery for any lottery that provides
a reward of S with probability q > p (and reward F with probability 1 − q). Let us
now consider the following mechanism: after the subject has reported a probability p, a
random number q is drawn. If q is smaller than p, the subject is paid according to the
7Nevertheless, recent papers try to correct the QSR from risk attitudes (Offerman, Sonnemans, Van de
Kuilen, and Wakker (2009), Andersen, Fountain, Harrison, and Rutstrom (2010), Kothiyal, Spinu, and
Wakker (2010)).
12
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task lottery. If q is greater than p, the subjects is paid according to a new lottery that
provides the same reward with probability q, called the bonus lottery.
The Lottery Rule is very much in the line with the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (1964)
mechanism and does provide incentives to truthfully reveal p. To make this clear, suppose
that the subject thinks the probability is p but reports a lower probability r. If the
randomly chosen q is lower than r, the subject is paid according to the task lottery. If
q > p, the subject benefits from the exchange of the lottery task to the bonus lottery. The
interesting case arises when r < q < p. The subject is thus paid according to the bonus
lottery, that has a lower probability of winning than the task lottery. So, the subject
is worse off. Therefore underreporting p makes the subject worse off with a positive
probability. Now consider a subject who overreports by stating a r above p. Again, the
interesting case arises when r > q > p. In such a situation, the subject will not benefit
from the bonus lottery and end up with the task lottery that has a lower probability
of winning. So overreporting leads to an expected loss. Hence, the subject has then
incentives to truthfully report his best estimates.
The true advantage of the Lottery Rule is that incentives are provided regardless of
subjects’ risk aversion8. Nevertheless, its main problem is that this rule is quite compli-
cated and thus cognitively demanding. It is then of a particular interest to test whether
the complexity of the Lottery Rule is indeed a problem.
In the experimental design, the Lottery Rule is implemented using a 0 to 100 scale,
with steps of 5 (see Figure 4). The subjects received detailed explanations about the
mechanism. The objective probability is determined using a uniform distribution between
40 and 100. Note that the nature of the distribution does not have any impact on the
nature of provided incentives. Subjects receive 10e for a correct answer if they are paid
on the basis of the task lottery. If they benefited from the bonus lottery, a random draw
determine whether they win. Remark that in such a case, their payment does not depend
any longer on the quality of their answer. A favorable draw also leads to a payment of
10e.
3.3 Free Rule
The Free Rule just requires the subjects to report their beliefs, without relating any
monetary consequences to stated probabilities. Nothing is done to provide incentives.
8More details and a formalization can be found in Karni (2009). Nevertheless Kadane and Winkler
(1988) argue that this elicitation rule may not permit beliefs to be disentangled from utilities if the agents’
wealth is correlated with the event. For the tasks we consider, this problem does not hold.
13
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p0
100
50
25
75
Confidence
Lottery 1
Keep their bet
p > l1
Get a lottery ticket
p < l1
Lottery 2
Loose
l2 > l1
Win
l2 < l1
Figure 4: Lottery Rule
The strong advantage of such a rule is of course its simplicity. It is the less cognitively
demanding one, especially comparing to the two previous ones.
The Free Rule is widely used in psychology and neurosciences. In particular, exper-
iments that involve scanning the subjects are very sensitive to response times, as the
duration of the experiment is limited and requires a high number of trials to obtain sta-
tistically significant results. Thus, the Free Rule is particularly attractive as beliefs are
elicited in a very short period of time. It is also the case that psychologists are much
less concerned by incentives than economists. So providing incentives for beliefs elici-
tation sometimes seems pointless, especially if incentives come at the price of a higher
complexity.
Under the Free Rule (see Figure 5), the subject justh as to choose a level of confidence
between 0 and 100 (with steps of 5). Payments are only based on responses, whatever
the accuracy of elicited beliefs. A correct answer to the selected quiz question provides a
payment of 10e (0 if uncorrect).
4 Methods for comparing elicitation rules
In this section, we first present the three statistical tools we use to measure the quality
of judgment and to compare elicitation rules and then we introduce the last criterion
14
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p0 1005025 75
Confidence
Figure 5: Free Rule
based on Signal Detection Theory. Even if one does not agree with the model proposed
in section 2, comparing rules on the basis of the quality of probability assessment is still
meaningful on a pure statistical basis. It is always better to use rules that allow for
accurate forecasting.
4.1 Calibration
To measure the accuracy of judgment, the most commonly used criterion is the distance
between the mean predicted success rate and the actual one. This is the so called cal-
ibration criterion. Well calibrated stated beliefs are those which, on average, exhibit a
small distance between predicted and actual success rate. The measure of calibration is
relatively straightforward. Consider a subject who stated beliefs about n events, pi, being
his stated probability for event Ei, xi being the indicator variable that takes value 1 if he
accurately predicts event Ei.
calibration index =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(pi − xi)
A null value indicates that the subject is perfectly calibrated. A positive calibration
indicates that the subject is overconfident, while a negative one denotes underconfidence.
Note that by construction, the confidence predicted by the Signal Detection Model exhibits
a perfect calibration p˜.
As we are interested in self-confidence related beliefs, we expect to find some over-
confidence in our data. It is thus likely that individuals predict higher success rate that
the one they really obtain. Indeed, it is common to consider that overconfidence and
thus, miscalibration is a distinctive trait of many people (Camerer and Lovallo (1999),
Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005), Blavatskyy (2009), Clark and Friesen (2009)).
Asking for correct calibration is thus questionable.
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4.2 Discrimination
Another important criterion to compare elicitation rules is discrimination. The ability
to discriminate refers to the capacity of individuals to make a distinction between the
probability of occurrence of two events. A subject that provides the same probability
whatever the events will have a very low discrimination ability. It is important to note that
such a subject might however be well calibrated if he reports for each trial a probability
equals to his average success rate. Calibration and discrimination are thus two distinct
notions, that both measure the accuracy of stated beliefs.
The corresponding statistical measure is given by the area under the ROC curve.
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) analysis is a graphical technique to visualize,
organize and select classifiers according to their performance (Green and Swets (1966),
Hanley and McNeil (1982))9. Here, a classifier is a dichotomous criteria based on a given
level of confidence. Consider for example the classifier associated with the level of 0.7.
This classifier will predict that each task that received a level of confidence higher than 0.7
will be classify as a success, while those with lower confidence will be classified as a failure.
Such a classifier is not perfect. It sometimes predicts success when it should not, these
are called the false positives. This allows the true positive rate to be computed (TPR),
i.e. the fraction of predicted successes that are correctly predicted, and the false positive
rate (FTP), i.e. the fraction of failures that are incorrectly predicted. Each classifier can
then be represented on a two dimensional (TPR, FTP) space. Each level of confidence
provides a point in this space. One can then fit a curve that relates these points, which
is called the ROC curve. The area under the ROC curve (ROC Area) provides a measure
of discrimination that is, the ability of the elicited confidence to correctly classify trials
according to success or failure. To understand the meaning of the ROC area, we consider
the situation in which trials are already correctly classified into two groups (success and
failure) and we pick randomly a pair of trials, one from the success group and one from
the failure group. The trial with the higher confidence should be the one from the success
group. The area under the curve is the percentage of randomly drawn pairs for which
this is true (that is, confidence correctly classifies trials in the random pair).
One advantage of the ROC analysis is that it uses confidence level only ordinally. For
instance, if a subject is good at ranking his confidence but has some problem to give
absolute values, his ROC Area can still be high. For our purposes, we prefer this latter
criterion as it really catches the quality of the elicited confidence in terms of forecasting.
9See Kaivanto (2006) for an application in economics
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4.3 Composite index
One important measure of overall performance in the accuracy of a judgment is the Brier
Score (Brier (1950)). Following previous notation, the Brier Score is given by
BS =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(pi − xi)
2.
The Murphy Decomposition (Murphy (1972), Yates (1982)) shows that the Brier Score
aggregates a calibration and a discrimination index. Indeed, it can be expressed as:
BS = f(1− f)−
1
n
∑
p∈P
Np(fp − f)
2 +
1
n
∑
p∈P
Np(p− fp)
2
where f =
∑n
i=1 (xi) is the mean success rate, P is the set of possible probability judg-
ments, Np is the number of times that the confidence category p is used and fp is the mean
success rate in that class. The first term is the variance of the outcome variable which
is independent of the judgment, the second term is a discrimination index measuring the
ability of the hit rate around the overall base rate (f) and the last term is a calibration
index which measures the difference between the observed hit rate (fp) and the stated
confidence. Note that contrary to the ROC analysis, confidence levels are used cardinally.
4.4 Distance between expected and elicited beliefs
The last criterion only holds in the psychometric setting. As we can predict using Signal
Detection Theory the expected distribution of confidence for each subject, we can compare
it to the elicited distribution of confidence. We compute a Chi-Square distance between
the two distributions that allows for the comparison of two distributions. Formally the
distance is computed as following:
χ2 =
∑
p∈P
(Np − Ep)
2
Ep
where Ep and Np are respectively the expected and the observed number of the confidence
level p occurrence. Then, for each rule we can compare these distances between observed
and predicted distribution of confidence and identify which rule is the closest to the
theoretical predictions.
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5 Results
Before moving to comparative results, we will describe the main characteristics of the
experiment and give some descriptive statistic stated confidences results.
5.1 Experimental design
The experiment took place in June and October 2009 at the Laboratory of Experimen-
tal Economics in Paris (LEEP). Subjects were recruited using LEEP’s database. Most
subjects were students from all fields. The experiments last for about 90 minutes. Sub-
jects were paid 19 e on average. This computer-based experiment uses Matlab with the
Psychophysics Toolbox version 3 (Brainard (1997)) and has been achieved on computers
with 1024x768 screens.
Payments comprise three parts. The cognitive tasks are paid according to a standard
procedure to avoid edging problems: one question is randomly selected at the end of the
experiment and payments are computed according to the elicitation rule used. The case
of the perceptual task is different, as each successful trial is rewarded according to the
elicitation rule used (reward is 10cts for the Free and the Lottery Rules). Subjects also
received a show-up fee of 5 e.
Our protocol enables us to investigate learning effects as we consider three sets of
tasks. The same rule is used all along the session. The first block is composed of 36 quiz
questions. Beliefs are elicited but no feedback is provided. Then subjects move on 100
trials of the perceptual task in which they get direct feedback (both on their accuracy and
on their use of the rule). This should help subjects to improve their use of the elicitation
rule. The third block is composed of 36 quiz questions, which are similar to the ones
used in the first block, i.e. with no feedback. As we would like to compare the relative
performance in the first and the third block, quiz questions were chosen so that they could
be compared (similar subjects and similar success rates).
In each session, all beliefs were elicited using the same rule. We ran two session for
each rule, that allowed to collect data for 35 to 38 subjects for each rule. As we mostly
compare results between sessions, our design is a simple 3× 1 one.
5.2 Confidence data
As a preliminary step, we perform some descriptive analysis to draw a general picture
of elicited beliefs. In Figure 6, we represent the cumulative probability distributions of
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elicited confidence for both tasks and for each rule. The results for all subjects are pooled.
Figure 6: Cumulative probability distribution of confidence for each rule
It is clear that while the Lottery Rule and the Free Rule provide close cumulative
distribution, the Quadratic Scoring Rule curve differs significantly from the two others.
The difference is due to the fact that the QSR has a strong tendency to display stated
probabilities concentrated on two values, 50% and 100%: almost two third of elicited
probabilities range between these two values, this is twice as much as for the two other
rules.
Let us now turn to a crude survey of how subjects, taken together, do judge themselves.
Figure 7 compares the predicted success rate to the actual success rate, according to stated
beliefs. A strong result, i.e. that applies for the three rules, is that subjects are globally
overconfident. More precisely, the difference between expected and observed success rates
increases for high level of stated confidence. Pooling all the tasks for which subjects stated
a 100% probability of success leads to an actual success rate of about 78%. In contrast,
low confidence (around 50%) leads to actual success rates that are roughly in line with
expected ones. Even if the three rules are similar, some differences are worth being noted.
None of the rules provides strictly increasing curves. It is not always the case that a 5%
increase in stated probability leads to increase in the associated success rate. The most
dramatic case is that of the QSR, for which there is not significant differences among
stated probabilities in the range [65, 95]. On average, any such probability leads to an
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approximate rate of success of 67%.
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Figure 7: Matching between confidence and accuracy
This figure represents for the three rules the mean accuracy for each level of confidence between 50 and 100 with step of
5. We can see that the Lottery Rule and the Free Rule have a more regular and almost linear increasing function than the
Quadratic Scoring Rule which takes on average a same level of accuracy for the intermediate level of confidence.
Conversely, we also observe the classical ”hard-easy” effect (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff
(1977)), that is, overconfidence for hard task and underconfidence in easy task. In Figure
8, we draw the mean success rate and confidence values for each question of the quiz. We
clearly see on the left-hand side of the figure that high overconfidence is associated with
the most difficult quiz questions and on the right, underconfidence with the less difficult
questions. Note that some questions are misleading e.g. 80% of the subjects are pretty
sure that they got the correct answer and thus stated high confidence, while in fact they
were wrong. The Figure 8 provides some indication about the frequency of such questions.
Removing these misleading questions will thus diminish overconfidence by almost half.
The ”hard-easy” effect is also observed for the perceptual task. Note that the Signal
Detection Model predicts such an effect. Indeed, since subjects form belief on the basis
of a Bayesian analysis of noisy signals, they are overconfident when the difficulty is high
(α0 or α1) as erroneous signals emerge and are underconfident when the difficulty is low
(α3 or α4). In Table 2, we report the observed and predicted confidence as well as the
observed success rate.
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Figure 8: Ranked success rate and overconfidence to quiz questions
This figure shows the level of mean accuracy for each question of the quiz. The circle corresponds to general knowledge
questions and the diamond to logical questions. The red bar is the level of over/under confidence depending on the direction
(up/down) of this bar. As we can expect, we find an ”hard-easy effect”, i.e. a greater overconfidence for more difficult sets
of questions and some underconfidence for easy questions.
Observed mean confidence Predicted mean confidence Success rate
LR QSR FR LR QSR FR LR QSR FR
α0 71% 69% 72% 64% 63% 64% 45% 52% 50%
α1 72% 71% 74% 64% 64% 64% 60% 60% 58%
α2 72% 73% 74% 66% 65% 66% 69% 67% 67%
α3 77% 76% 78% 71% 69% 70% 82% 79% 80%
α4 94% 96% 94% 95% 95% 91% 100% 100% 100%
Table 2: Observed and predicted mean confidence. (Std. in brackets)
Notice that the Signal Detection Model predicts very small differences in mean confi-
dence for the three more difficult levels while success rates range from around 50% (α0)
to 70% (α2). Empirically, these predictions are confirmed for the three rules.
5.3 Quality of judgment
We turn now to the statistical index of quality judgment. Table 3 provides some measures
using the statistical index described above. The QSR performs better in terms of calibra-
tion, as it displays a lower degree of overconfidence than the two other rules. This result
is a weak support for QSR since it is plagued by risk aversion and since overconfidence
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is well established. The QSR is likely to generate an underestimated overconfidence. As
expected from Figure 7, the Lottery Rule provides a better discrimination than the QSR
with an area under the ROC curve of 0.6401. Using the composite index, Lottery Rule
clearly outperforms the two other rules with a Brier Score of 0.2245. The more stricking
results is that the Free Rule appears slightly better than the QSR.
Rule Overconfidence ROC Area Brier Score
LR 0.0822 (.0057) 0.6401 (.0070) 0.2245
QSR 0.0668 (.0061) 0.6300 (.0073) 0.2262
FR 0.1065 (.0060) 0.6305 (.0074) 0.2259
(LR - QSR) +0.0153 (0.0329) +0.0101 (0.3186) -0.0017 (0.0026)
(LR - FR) -0.0243 (0.0017) +0.0096 (0.3458) -0.0014 (0.0314)
(QSR - FR) -0.0396 (0.0000) -0.0005 (0.9608) +0.0003 (0.3830)
Table 3: Comparison of rules
This table (as the following) summarizes the values and the tests of differences of the three criteria used to evaluate the
accuracy of confidence for the three rules. For each rule, we have the level of overconfidence with the standard deviation,
the area under the ROC curve (with s.d.) and the value of the Brier Score. Then, we compare the rules by pairs and we
find the level of difference for each criteria. We perform a test of difference: for the overconfidence and the Brier Score we
test the significance of the inequality between the rules (t-test with the p-value in parenthesis); and for the ROC Area we
test the significance of the equality between the rules (Chi-square test with p-value in parenthesis).
One may wonder whether this ranking is robust to learning effects. The QSR and
the Lottery Rules are cognitively demanding and we expect their performance to increase
with practice. Our experiments is designed so as to offer subjects the opportunity to learn
using feedback. Remember that we use three blocks of questions. The second one relates
to the perceptual task with feedback. The idea was to use this task as a training phase
for the elicitation rule. Therefore, we can compare beliefs’ accuracy in the first and third
block (where the tasks to be performed are quiz questions of similar difficulty). The Table
4 provides details about the learning effect under the three different rules. It compares
the relative performance in the two sets of quiz questions. The overall effect is limited and
its direction is unclear. If learning occurs, we should observe more accurate results, i.e.
better calibration or better discrimination. Our results does not support this view. The
most significant effect, if any, is found for the Lottery Rule. The Brier Score increases
from 0.2464 to 0.2548, mainly because calibration is not as good as in the first part. This
does not completely rule out the possibility that subjects indeed learn as another effect,
e.g. subjects get tired, might work in the opposite direction. But even if this is the case,
we can conclude that none of the rules display a clear advantage in terms of learning.
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Tasks Brier Score Overconfidence ROC Area
LR Q1 0.2464 0.1117 (.0131) 0.6158 (.0154)
LR Q2 0.2548 0.1326 (.0130) 0.6318 (.0151)
LR (Q2 - Q1) +0.0084 (0.0000) +0.0209 (0.1282) +0.0160 (0.4594)
QSR Q1 0.2607 0.0786 (.0142) 0.5770 (.0161)
QSR Q2 0.2589 0.0934 (.0141) 0.5949 (.0157)
QSR (Q2 - Q1) -0.0018 (0.1842) +0.0148 (0.2295) +0.0179 (0.4270)
FR Q1 0.2586 0.1510 (.0137) 0.6143 (.0158)
FR Q2 0.2590 0.1448 (.0138) 0.5885 (.0161)
FR (Q2 - Q1) +0.0004 (0.4177) -0.0062 (0.3741) -0.0258 (0.2533)
Table 4: Learning: cognitive tasks
5.4 Perceptual data
The superiority of the Lottery Rule and the Free Rule over QSR is confirmed when we
compare stated confidence to the Signal Detection Model predictions. Indeed, let us
consider for the perceptual task the cumulative probability distributions for each rule
and for the Signal Detection Model predictions (all subjects pooled) drawn in Figure 9.
Contrary to the QSR, the shapes of the LR and the FR curves follow the Signal Detection
Model.
Figure 9: Cumulative probability distribution of confidence for each rule and SDT
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The difference between the QSR curve and the three others is also due to the con-
centration of probabilities around 50% and 100% with again almost two third of elicited
probabilities that take these values. Note that SDT predicts that only 24% of stated con-
fidence should take these two values (see Table 12 in appendix)10. This visual feeling is
confirmed when we compute the Chi-Square distance between the observed and predicted
confidence distribution for each group of subjects. To get a fixed idea about the distance
values, we also provide the distance between the predicted confidence and the uniform
distribution on [50%; 100%] as well as the distance between the predicted confidence and
a Dirac measure that puts a probability of 1 on 100%. Results are given in Table 5.
Chi-square distance btw. pred. confid. and... LR (n=38) QSR (n=35) FR (n=35)
...observed confidence distribution 0.20 1.17 0.80
...a uniform distribution 0.29 0.31 0.28
...a Dirac measure δ100% 5.29 5.97 6.08
Table 5: Chi-square distance between confidence distributions
The Lottery Rule clearly outperforms the QSR in its ability to fit with predicted
confidence11. Further analysis confirms this result.
For the perceptual task, subjects go through a training phase during which an auto-
matic adjustment of difficulty was done so as to make the subjects succeed at 70% for
the medium difficulty level. This adjusment was not perfect and during the main task
subjects’ success rate differs with a overall mean success of 71.2% (67.7% for the medium
level), a standard deviation of mean success equal to 6% and a mean success ranging from
56% to 86%. Accordingly, the Signal Detection Model predicts that mean confidence
should be lower for those whose the task was more difficult given their abilities (see ap-
pendix for detail). Therefore, we should find a correlation between elicited and predicted
mean confidence. In the Table 6, we give the observed and predicted mean confidence
values as well as the correlation between observed and predicted mean confidence.
We observe a significant correlation between the observed and predicted mean confi-
dence (at a level of 10%) only for the Lottery Rule while there is no correlation for the
QSR.
10The percentage of elicited confidence concentrated on 50% and 100% is 27% for LR, 35% for FR and
65% for QSR
11Despite its weaknesses, the QSR performs decently in terms of discrimination because it permits to
correctly classify easy trials (difficulty levels α3 and α4) and difficult trials (difficulty levels α0 and α1).
We guess that QSR discrimination performance would be lower for a hard task without low levels of
difficulty.
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Nb Observed mean confidence Predicted mean confidence Correlation
LR 38 77% (9%) 72% (5%) 0.30*
QSR 35 77% (10%) 71% (4%) 0.02
FR 35 79% (9%) 71% (7%) 0.12
Table 6: Observed and predicted mean confidence. (Std. in brackets) (* means signifi-
cance at 10%)
The Signal Detection Model also predicts that those for which the task was more
difficult given their ability should have a lower discrimination index, either measured by
the ROC area or by the Brier score. Therefore, we expect to find correlations between
mean success rates and discrimination indexes. Furthermore, we should also observe
correlations between observed and predicted discrimination indexes. Clearly, we see in
Table 7 that the levels of correlation are poorer for the QSR than for the two other rules.
For instance, the predicted correlation between the mean success rate and ROC area for
the LR group is 0.8439 and 0.4855 for the predicted and observed beliefs while these
correlations are respectively 0.9082 and 0.0074 for the QSR group. It is even worse for
correlation between predicted and observed ROC area as there is not any correlation at
all for the QSR group. Among the two other rules, the Lottery Rule rule performs slightly
better than the Free Rule.
Correlation Nb Mean succ./ROC Mean succ./Brier ROC obs/pre Brier Obs/pre
LR
Pred.
Obs.
38
0.8439***
0.4855***
-0.8728***
-0.8633***
0.4951*** 0.7825***
QSR
Pred.
Obs.
35
0.9082***
0.0074
-0.8700***
-0.4253**
-0.0143 0.4272**
Free
Pred.
Obs.
35
0.9455***
0.3498**
-0.9336***
-0.7761***
0.4617*** 0.7680***
Table 7: Correlation between mean success rate, ROC Area and Brier score (observed
and predicted) for the task perception (*** means a level of significance at 1%. ** means
a level of significance at 5%)
6 Further results and interpretation
Existing work in psychology and neuroscience puts forward some regularities about con-
fidence. If SDT happens to be a good model of the way subjects processes information,
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there are a few additional predictions that can be tested. For instance, Fleming, Weil,
Nagy, Dolan, and Rees (2010) and Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, and Lau
(2010) provide evidence revealing that the brain areas responsible for performing the task
and assessing confidence are distinct. Therefore the simple description of the brain pro-
cess depicted on Figure 2 and 3 accounts for empirical evidence. Everything goes as if
subjects receive a noisy signal that is first used to perform the task, then transmitted
-up to some noise- to another area responsible for assessing confidence. If we follow the
two models proposed in Figures 2 and 3, discrimination ability reflects how well the brain
areas responsible for performing the task are connected to the brain areas responsible for
assessing confidence.
For some subjects we do indeed observe that the mismatch occurs: subject unable
to discriminate have their confidences disconnected from subjective beliefs. This raises
the question of whether subjects who are good at discriminating on one task are also
good when proceeding another task. There are some experimental evidence showing that
people are overconfident over domains even if their levels of overconfidence may vary with
the domain, and that more overconfident people in one domain tend also to be more
overconfident in other domain (West and Stanovich (1997)). For discrimination, evidence
are scarce but according to Bornstein and Zickafoose (1999), it seems also to be the case
that discrimination abilities export across domains. In Table 8, we report our findings on
the correlation between tasks for calibration and discrimination.
Corr. btw. Quiz and Perception All (104) LR (38) QSR (34) FR (32)
Calibration 0.57*** 0.47*** 0.69*** 0.49***
ROC area 0.27*** 0.35** 0.15 0.33*
Table 8: Correlation between tasks
For all rules, we find some high correlations for calibration. For discrimination, we
find significant correlation only for the Lottery Rule and for the Free Rule. Note that
SDT predicts that subjects cannot have a high ROC area if their task was hard in the
perceptual task. Thus, to measure the subject intrinsic discrimination ability, we must
take into account the predicted ROC area which stands for benchmark value. So we
created a ROC performance attainment measure defined as follows:
ROC pa =
ROCarea(observed)− 0.5
ROCarea(predicted)− 0.5
.
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We expect this variable to correlate with the ROC area observed for the quiz task. In
Table 9 we report these correlations.
All (104) LR (38) QSR (34) FR (32)
Corr. btw. quiz ROC area and ROC pa 0.10 0.31* 0.00 0.07
Table 9: Correlation between ROC in Quiz and ROC performance in Perception.
Significant correlation remains only for the Lottery Rule. Thus discrimination ability
seems more domain specific than calibration ability. Note also, that the choice of elicita-
tion rule strongly matters. Indeed, the Lottery Rule results confirms our conjecture on
intrinsic discrimination ability while the QSR results invalidates it.
Calibration and discrimination are two statistically independent aspect of judgment
ability. We may wonder whether subjects who are more able on one dimension, do so
in the other. Table 10 indicates correlations between calibration and discrimination for
subjects whose overconfidence is below 30%12.
Corr. btw. Calibration and ROC area All (104) LR (38) QSR (34) FR (32)
All task -0.14 -0.06 -0.35** -0.01
Quizz task -0.20** -0.17 -0.39** -0.18
Perception task -0.11 -0.07 -0.14 -0.12
Table 10: Calibration versus discrimination
We find significant correlation only for the Quiz task and this arises from the result
obtained using the QSR. Because of the poor overall performance of the QSR, we may
conclude that calibration and discrimination abilities are independently distributed in the
population.
To sum up, we find that the LR matches the prediction of SDT and also satisfies some
additional properties. We interpret this as supporting the view that LR indeed elicits
signals that are correlated with the ones uses by the brain to assess confidence. On the
whole, our results supports the model set forth in Section 2. An intriguing question is
then to figure out why the LR fits so well, while another rule like QSR does not. A
possible interpretation is that for the LR -as well as the Free Rule- subjects are directly
asked to report the beliefs they consciously have in mind. In contrast, the QSR requires
12We exclude outlayers because they correspond to subjects who always choose extreme confidence and
therefore were highly miscalibrated and discriminated poorly
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the subjects to take the monetary rewards into account. They need to evaluate for each
level of confidence how high they should bet. At the very least, subjects have to perform
some additional computing to achieve a good decision. This extra computation is likely
to introduce some additional noise into the signal we are trying to elicit. But we also
learn from the post-wagering literature, that rules in which subjects are asked to set their
wages themselves -like the QSR- are dependent on some economic variables, typically
risk aversion. Reviewing current evidence, Fleming and Dolan (2010) conclude that ”the
complex interaction between objective stimulus visibility, wager size and the subsequent
willingness to gamble casts doubt on the assertion (Persaud, McLeod, and Cowey (2007))
that post-decision wagering is a direct index of subjective awareness, despite its intuitive
nature.”
7 Conclusion
Both our experimental settings provide consistent evidence: the choice of a particular
elicitation rule does matter. The Lottery Rule performs particularly well according to
the discrimination index. The Lottery Rule also matches remarkably well the predictions
made using Signal Detection Theory. Furthermore, the Lottery Rule has the theoretical
advantage to be not sensitive to risk aversion. All in all, we find little support for the
use of the QSR in economics. The Free Rule performed well. Although it elicits a bit
less accurate beliefs, it is the simplest rule that can be implemented. Thus elicitation
rules which ask subjects to report their feelings in terms of a visual metric outperform
elicitation rules which are based on a revealed preference approach through the choice of
stakes. The fact that incentives are not so important supports the view that there exist
pure subjective beliefs that are disconnected from utility values.
Another interesting result is the high heterogeneity we find in individual’s discrimi-
nation abilities. In our experiment discrimination ability -as measured by the ROC area-
ranges from 0.51 to 0.79. In other words some subjects are almost unable to discriminate
at all, while others perform remarkably well. However, subjects with low discrimination
abilities perform as well as high discrimination abilities’ subjects, i.e. their success rates
are not statistically different. This important variability across individuals is confirmed
by recent neuroeconomic findings (Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, and Rees (2010), Rounis,
Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, and Lau (2010)). They find that discrimination abil-
ity is linked to how well the brain areas responsible for performing the task are connected
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with the brain areas responsible for assessing confidence. The ability to discriminate is
also independent from their calibration ability. Formally, calibration and discrimination
are statistically independent: one can be very well calibrated without discriminating well
and vice versa. In economics, most research focus on overconfidence (Camerer and Lovallo
(1999), Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005), Blavatskyy (2009), Clark and Friesen
(2009)). So far discrimination has not received much attention while it is certainly as
important as calibration to explain economic behavior.
8 Appendix
8.1 Signal detection model
We detail here how we apply the Signal Detection Theory to induce subjective beliefs.
8.1.1 The basis for the prediction of confidence distribution
Let us consider for instance a subject who receives a signal y˜ = yL− yR > 0. The signal y˜
follows a Normal Law with a mean equals to the real difference in dots x˜ = xL − xR and
a variance σ2i where σi reflects the sensibility quality of the subject. We assume that the
subjects’ brain is aware of the quality of his vision system and of the distribution of dots
used during the task. We then apply a Bayesian analysis. First, notice that since the
priors are symmetric between left and right, if the subject receives a positive signal he will
believe with a probability above .5 that the real signal is positive, i.e P (x˜ ≥ 0|y˜ ≥ 0) ≥ .5
and thus he guesses left. In the following, we suppose that the subject confidence in
guessing right is equal to his belief.
Thus, given a value y˜, the subject confidence in winning is equal to
P (y˜) = Proba(x˜ = xL − xR > 0|y˜) + .5Proba(x˜ = xL − xR = 0|y˜).
The second term catches the probability of evenness between xL and xR so that the subject
wins with a .5 probability. By Bayes law,
P (y˜) =
Proba(y˜|x˜ > 0).Proba(x˜ > 0) + .5Proba(y˜|x˜ = 0).Proba(x˜ = 0)
Proba(y˜)
Under the assumption that the brain is aware of the distribution of dots used during
29
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.88
the task, then:
Proba(x˜ = 0) = Proba(x˜ = ±αi) = Proba(x˜ = ±25) = .2
and thus
P (y˜) =
( ∑
j=0,..,4
f (y˜|x˜ = αj)
)
( ∑
j=0,..,4
f (y˜|x˜ = αj)
)
+
( ∑
j=0,..,4
f (y˜|x˜ = −αj)
)
with f the density function of the normal law.
Similar computation for a negative signal −y˜ shows that P (−y˜) = P (y˜). We note that
confidence P (y˜) is strictly increasing in |y˜|. Then, the probability to observe a confidence
level p˜ is the probability that the brain receives a signal y˜ such that P (|y˜|) = p˜. Given
αj, the density function for the confidence p˜ is equal to
g(p˜) = .5
(
f (y˜|x˜ = αj) + f (−y˜|x˜ = αj)+
f (y˜|x˜ = −αj) + f (−y˜|x˜ = −αj)
)
for y˜ ≥ 0 such that P (|y˜|) = p˜
In the experiment, confidence was elicitated with a path of 5%. We proceed similarly
for the prediction of confidence. Hence, we suppose that an elicitated confidence of 50 %
corresponds to an underlying confidence between 50% and 52.5%, of 55 % corresponds to
an underlying confidence between 52.5% and 57.5% and so on .....Therefore, given αj, the
probability of observing p ∈ {.55; .60; ...} is
Q(p|αj) =
p˜=p+.025∫
p˜=p−.025
g(p˜)dp˜.
and overall, the predicted distribution of confidence is given by
Q(p) = .2
∑
j=0,..,4
Q(p|αj).
By construction, the predicted confidence reflects perfect calibration, that is, the mean
success rate is equal to p˜ when confidence is p˜:
Proba (Correct Guess|p˜) = Proba (x˜.y˜ > 0|p˜)+.5Proba(x˜ = 0|p˜) = p˜ for y˜ such that P (|y˜|) = p˜.
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For our estimates, we make the approximation that when pooling confidence, we also
have perfect calibration, i.e:
Proba (Correct Guess|p) = p for p ∈ {.50; .55; .60; ...; 1}
8.1.2 Implementation details
The model is applied at an individual level. The first step is to estimate for each individual
his ability σi. His ability is revealed through his success rate at levels αj=1,..,4. At level
αj, we observe ni,j trials and ri,j successes. We compute σi such that∑
j=1,..,4
ni,j .F (0|αj, σ
2
i ) =
∑
j=1,..,4
ri,j
The following table gives the descriptive statistics for the σi.
Nb Mean Std. Dev. Min;Max
σi 108 7.95 5.30 2.8 ;50.5
Table 11: Ability of subjects
From σi, we can compute for each i and level αj the confidence distribution on p ∈
{.55; .60; ...}:
Qi(p|αj) =
p˜=p+.025∫
p˜=p−.025
g(p˜)dp˜.
The overall confidence distribution is then computed using the observed levels’ fre-
quencies:
Qi(p) =
∑
j=0,..,4
ni,j
100
.Qi(p|αj).
Some descriptive statistics for the confidence distribution are given in the Figure 10.
Given these confidence distributions, we can calculate the predicted judgment qual-
ity index. Calibration is not really an issue since predicted mean confidence, predicted
mean success and observed mean success should be very close by construction. The only
divergence comes from the fact that empirical success rate at level α0 may not be exactly
50% because of a low number of trials and of the approximation done in the estimation
of confidence. We can check in the Table 12 that it is indeed the case.
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Figure 10: SDT prediction of confidence distribution
Difference btw... Nb Mean Std. Dev. Min;Max
predicted and observed mean success 108 .00 .02 -.04;.07
predicted mean success and predicted mean confidence 108 -.00 .01 -.02;.02
Table 12: Consistency of prediction
For discrimination, to calculate predicted area under the ROC curve we first estimate
predicted True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate at each cutpoint. For instance, if
we consider fix confidence level p as a cutpoint, TPR is given by:
Proba(Confidence > p|Success) =
Predicted mean success−
∑
p′≤p
p′.Qi(p
′)
Predicted mean success
and FPR is defined by:
Proba(Confidence > p|Failure) =
∑
p′>p
(1− p′).Qi(p
′)
Predicted mean failure
.
Given estimation of TPR-FPR at each cutpoint p ∈ {.50; .55; .60; ...; 1}, a predicted
ROC Area can be computed for each subject.
Finally, the computation of predicted Brier Score by subject is done using the following
formula: ∑
p∈{.50;.55;.60;...;1}
Qi(p).
[
p (p− 1)2 + (1− p).p2
]
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The Table 13 gives a summary of the values obtained
Nb Mean Std. Dev. Min;Max
ROC Area 108 .72 .05 .55;.83
Brier score 108 .18 .03 .12;.25
Table 13: Predicted ROC area and Brier score
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